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Introduction  
 
 
Disasters, revolutions, and volcanoes do not make love with the stars.  
The erotic revolutionary and volcanic deflagrations antagonize the heavens.  
As in the case of violent love, they take place beyond the constraints of fecundity.  
In opposition to celestial fertility there are terrestrial disasters, the image of terrestrial love 
without conditions, erection without escape and without rule, scandal, and terror.  
 
––Georges Bataille, The Solar Anus 
 
Despite being infamous for his erotic works, such as The Solar Anus and Story of the Eye, 
Georges Bataille offers a compelling political philosophy in The Accursed Share.1 While some of 
his critics devalue his philosophical work on the grounds of his penchant for deviant behavior, 
the following project will argue that Bataille’s political philosophy offers us a persuasive 
alternative to traditional social contract theory.2 This project works to reorient the concept of 
sovereignty from its normative location in social contract theory to alternative expressions of it 
in Bataille’s writing.  
This project is not an attack on social contract theory as a whole, instead it aims to push 
back against the conventions and institutions which were once derived from a social contract and 
expose the ways in which they fail to serve the people who they claim to represent today. In the 
following chapters the various traditional social contract theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Thomas Hobbes will be engaged, as well as nontraditional social contract theories, such as that 
                                                 
1 Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); 
––, Story of the Eye, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (San Francisco, CA: City Lights Books, 1987); ––, Eroticism and 
Sovereignty, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 2 & 3, The Accursed Share: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty (New 
York, NY: Zone Books, 1993). 
2 Critics of Bataille, such as Arendt, Habermas, and Cavarero, will be discussed in further detail in chapter two.  
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of Plato. However, John Locke’s social contract serves as the primary example of social contract 
theory against which Bataille’s philosophy is held.  
I decided to focus on Locke over his contemporaries primarily because of his influence 
on the founding of the American republic. A critical analysis of Locke’s social contract theory 
provides insight into some of the practical shortcomings of the political institutions that give 
form to American government. The case of America presents us with a unique example of the 
failure of social contract theory. The uniqueness of the American example, like myth, is twofold: 
in origin and in perpetuation.  
Unlike the social contracts of countries like France or England, America’s social contract 
founded an entirely new political organization. While the French and English revolutions, which 
inspired the social contracts of Rousseau and Hobbes respectively, resulted in the amendment of 
existing orders, the American revolution allowed for a radically new social and political 
beginning. Yet, American Revolutionists limited their political imaginations to the preexisting 
thought of thinkers like Locke. Despite making a claim in their declaration of independence to 
ground their political organization in continental reality, early Americans were still bound to the 
need for mythological explanations and philosophical treatises that rested upon imaginary human 
conditions. Social contract theory offers us a mythical origin of its political organization that 
ultimately works to reinforce extant political institutions that are not necessarily reflective of our 
contemporary moment.  
The second paradox of social contract theory is found in the tension between the 
historical moment in which a text was written and the contemporary life of a philosophical work. 
In many ways America’s collective political imagination is largely reliant on the perpetuation of 
our foundational myth. The essence of American identity demands a patriotic attachment to land, 
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to liberty, and most importantly to our shared social contract. This is seen in the invocation of the 
Constitution when deeming issues either just or unjust, or in more concrete political disputes like 
one’s attachment to the Second Amendment right during gun debates. It is also seen in the 
narrative of the American Dream, in which anyone can come to America and succeed in a way 
that early American founders did. The historical truth of the American founding, which rests on 
genocide, slavery, and the possession of land, is overlooked in order to preserve the 
philosophical good of its mythical origins. In reality, people prefer the rhetorical security of their 
constitutional rights over the safety and well-being of their fellow Americans. Who are we 
without our land? Who are we without our liberty? Who are we without the social contract that 
binds us together? What is America without its founding narrative? There is much to be said 
about the political problems that plague America today, in addition to the political strife we face 
world-wide. Unfortunately, I cannot take up these questions here, though I hope to address them 
adjacently while focusing on the manifestation of Locke’s social contract in the United States.  
Understanding the mythology of social contract theory carries with it important 
implications for our social and political life. While it encourages a level of distrust of convention 
and skepticism toward prevailing systems of authority, it also encourages us to look beyond 
standard visions of sovereignty in order to grasp it. Myth’s detachment from reality obstructs a 
social contract’s ability to realize its citizens’ sovereignty. While myth exists in theory, 
sovereignty exists in reality and is enforced through legal institutions. The reality of sovereignty 
is the pervasive problem of who has it and who ought to have it. This question of possession can 
be theoretically debated but sovereignty is fundamentally a practical matter and the theory 
around sovereignty should be historically grounded. It is my argument that Bataille’s political 
philosophy witnesses and expresses reality in ways that traditional social contract theory cannot.  
  4 
It is important to note that Bataille’s philosophy does not entirely escape paradox. The 
issue of his work lies in its necessary dependence on the inventions which perpetuate the very 
mythology he dispels. Despite claiming that “all words strangle [him],” Bataille is reliant on the 
conventions of language and knowledge which allow his work to be read, understood, and 
incorporated into the collective political imagination.3 However, Bataille is able to transcend the 
paradox between theory and practice which ultimately hinders Locke.  
Unlike Locke, Bataille’s life and philosophy demonstrate solidarity.4 What little we know 
about his personal life comes from what he himself chose to share with his readers, either in a 
contemplative forethought or explanatory postscript. We know that Bataille was born in 1897 in 
Reims, France, to a mother and a paralyzed, blind, and syphilic father, whom he and his mother 
abandoned in 1915 when Germany began to invade. In defiance of his father, who refused 
religion, Bataille temporarily embraced Catholicism until the early 1920s when he began 
attending school in Spain to train as a medievalist librarian. He ultimately gave up the librarian 
life to pursue a writing career. He became interested in subjects such as mysticism, eroticism, 
and temporarily surrealism, until becoming a member of the Collège de Sociologie. Bataille’s 
turn away from surrealism, and so too organized religion, marks his movement toward social 
explanations that are grounded in physical experience rather than unconscious influences. As a 
member of the Collège de Sociologie, Bataille developed an interest in human sacrifice, 
deviance, and sovereignty. Despite having limited knowledge of his personal life, the 
consistency of his written work, both in poetry and literature, also effectively confirms the 
integrity of his political philosophy.  
                                                 
3 Georges Bataille, The Collected Poems of Georges Bataille, trans. Mark Spitzer (Chester Springs, PA: Dufour 
Editions Inc., 1998), 13. 
4 The paradox between Locke’s social contract theory and practical participation in governance will be raised in 
chapter one.  
  5 
Bataille’s work is significant in part precisely because it employs the erotic. While his 
critics engage in efforts to other and taboo pleasure, Bataille is able to reconcile theory and 
practical life by grounding his philosophy in what is most personal to the human experience: 
desire. In fact, he positions desire at the center of sovereignty. His version of desire, much like 
his version of sovereignty, is nuanced. Both desire and sovereignty, according to Bataille, are 
unbound by the limits of objective life. The pursuit of desire beyond convention––that is, 
“beyond the constraints of fecundity” as he proclaims in The Solar Anus––realizes one’s 
sovereignty. Expressions of erotic desire unravel the myth in the same way that a “terrestrial 
disaster” does. They both do so in excess. By acting “without escape and without rule, scandal, 
and terror” ––by acting excessively––the individual breaks the binds of the social contract which 
tells them that their experience of sovereignty is conditional. In turning toward Bataille, who was 
writing in the middle of the twentieth century against fascism, I hope to show how we might 
rethink the canon of social contract theory in order to imagine a new form of sovereignty and 
being together in the world today.  
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Locke: A Failure of Theory or A Failure of Practice?  
“Salus populi suprema lex esto”  
––Cicero, De Legibus 
 
 
Social contract theory is deeply embedded in the implementation of government and the 
individual’s role as a citizen. This model of philosophy investigates prevailing systems of 
authority and works to either justify or dismantle them. Social contract theory, much like other 
forms of political philosophy, is dependent on subjective or loosely objective interpretations of 
being. This chapter will set out to explore some distinctive characteristics of social contract 
theory, its artificial quality, and undeniably precarious attempts at using fiction to ground 
practical life.  
Thomas Hobbes, for example, aims to sanctify the need for an absolute sovereign, what 
he calls a “Leviathan,” through his writing.5 Hobbes’ work responds to a need for the 
legitimization of monarchical rule that arose in England during the 1640s. His Leviathan reflects 
the shift in England's socio-political landscape following the English Civil War up until 1651, 
when King Charles II was deposed. The English Civil War was inspired by the conflict between 
Parliamentarians and Royalists. Thus, Hobbes’ theory addresses the need for a fabricated, yet 
reasoned, justification for one form of government over another.  
While Hobbes chose to uphold the predominant form of government in his work, other 
thinkers, like fellow Englishman John Locke, chose to dissent from it. In his response to Sir 
Robert Filmer’s defense of the divine right of kings, Locke advocates for a form of 
representative government that operates in accordance with what he calls the “common-wealth” 
                                                 
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1968). 
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against monarchy.6 Much like Hobbes, however, Locke’s social contract theory was published in 
1698 as a reaction to political unrest surrounding the 1688 Parliamentarian overthrow of King 
James II. The historical context of any given social contract is an important consideration 
because it reveals the need that the theory, and thus the government, responds to.  
Although social contract theory often concerns itself with the tension between natural 
rights and legal rights, consent of the governed, the origins of authority, and so on, it is driven by 
an essential problem of sovereignty: the question of who has it and who ought to have it. In most 
examples of social contract theory, the problem of sovereignty serves as the need for the theory 
itself. Rousseau’s social contract theory aims to dismiss the divinely derived power of kings and 
instead designs sovereignty as the people’s general will––the culmination of common interests. 
In The Social Contract, Rousseau writes on his assessment “that sovereignty is inalienable.”7 He 
elaborates by saying that  
the first and most important consequence of the principles [of the social contract] so far 
established is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the state in accordance 
with that end which the state has been established to achieve––the common good; for if 
conflict between private interests has made the setting up of civil societies necessary, 
harmony between those same interests has made it possible.8 
 
Rousseau understands that the social contract is authorized by the sovereignty of each individual 
and, thus, the general will addresses a universal sovereign interest rather than that of a particular 
sovereign. This is the “common good”––the good which is deemed as such because it is directed 
by the interests of many sovereigns, not just one. Rousseau also echoes a Lockean understanding 
that the State was established in response to the formation of civil society and the need for 
coordinating shared interests. He writes that “it is precisely on the basis of this common interest 
                                                 
6 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1980). 
7 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (London, England: Penguin Books, 1968), 
69.  
8 Ibid.  
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that society must be governed.”9 By instituting the State as the proprietor of popular sovereignty, 
Rousseau’s social contract theory mythologizes a government that cannot alienate its citizens 
from their own sovereignty. Therefore, social contract theory, in this instance and in many more, 
is rooted in the conceptual possession and preservation of sovereignty.10 
An early form of social contract theory appears in Plato’s Republic among various 
philosophical explorations of justice.11 A social contract can most clearly be seen when Socrates 
and his dialogic companions imagine a polis governed by a philosopher king. While Plato’s 
Republic is not often associated with other canonical social contract theories, this specific 
element of his philosophy clearly does the same work as the likes of Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau. Due to the fact that this philosophy predated the tradition of social contract theory, 
which was canonized during the 18th century Age of Enlightenment, Socrates uses another word, 
“noble lie,” to express the work that is now accredited to social contract theory. Both the noble 
lie and social contract theory aim to justify the organization of citizens in relation to the State or 
vice versa.  
Plato’s introduction of the noble lie comes in the midst of a discussion between Socrates 
and Glaucon on the proper appointment of guardians and rulers. After agreeing that those who 
are most fit to be guardians and rulers should be appointed as such, Socrates and Glaucon set out 
to find a method through which those fit individuals can be persuaded to assume their just roles. 
Socrates proposes that they, “contrive one of those lies that come into being in case of need, of 
which we were just now speaking, some one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 In contrast to sovereignty, many social contract theories willingly surrender a citizen’s freedom. Most traditional 
social contract theorists view the exchange of particular freedoms for general sovereignty to be a fair trade. The 
tension between freedom, the abdication of it, and sovereignty will be addressed later in the chapter in relation to 
Locke’s understanding of freedom’s operation in a social contract.  
11 Plato, The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2016). 
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rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city.”12 The necessity of a lie rests on their need to 
legitimize the socio-political organization of power which stems from their definition of justice. 
Socrates’ utilitarian model requires that citizens look past their personal interests or desires and 
instead prioritize a State sanctioned definition of justice. Therefore, in order to achieve their ideal 
Republic, the philosophers must persuade the citizens that the optimal way to organize is based 
on just practices that place each individual in a position to maximally profit for both themselves 
and for society.  
Edmund Morgan, in Inventing the People, provides a contemporary account of such a 
foundational lie. He states, “governments require make-believe.”13 All regimes, from the 
governments of Britain and the United States, to Russia and China, rely on fictions, or lies, to 
mold a reality which is optimally compatible with their regime type. The contents of the fictions 
are not as important as the role of the fictions themselves. Morgan states that, “because fictions 
are necessary, because we cannot live without them, we often take pains to prevent their collapse 
by moving the facts to fit the fiction, by making our world conform more closely to what we 
want it to be.”14 This is justified, according to Morgan, because the reality of the regime and the 
fiction which justifies it both rest on a precarious balance of reciprocity. The fiction must 
resemble reality and vice versa in order for a state’s citizens to believe in it. The practical 
application of the theory of the Republic, or any regime type for that matter, is reliant on the 
effective, consistent, and durable perpetuation of its myth.  
In his work, Morgan also effectively dispels the negative connotations that often 
accompany words like “fiction” or “lie,” and instead highlights their essential political purpose. 
As Socrates states in his introduction of the concept, the fiction comes out of this very need 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 414b. 
13 Edmund Morgan, Inventing the People (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 13.  
14 Ibid., 14.  
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which Morgan emphasizes. In the introduction of his book, Morgan muses that he “can only 
hope that readers who persevere to the end of the book will recognize that the fictional qualities 
of popular sovereignty sustain rather than threaten the human values associated with it.”15 
Despite being modes of manipulation, these fictions are the basis upon which we form our 
political imaginations. The actualization of social contract theory in political society, such as in 
the foundation and constitution of any modern state, is fundamentally the institutionalization of a 
fiction.  
Some theorists have had the foresight to acknowledge the precariousness of the social 
contract that they create. Rousseau recognizes that man’s 
absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the 
common cause as a gratuitous contribution . . . and fancying that the artificial person 
which constitutes the state is merely fictitious entity (since it is not a man), he might seek 
to enjoy the rights of a citizen without doing the duties of a subject.16 
 
The rejection of the social contract, the rejection of the general will, results in the unbound 
practice of sovereign power. The shift of sovereign power, if we recall, serves as the very need 
for the creation of a social contract in the first place. Therefore, the perception of the parliament, 
king, or democracy as a “fictitious entity” delivers the deviant citizen back to the state of being 
which most social contract theorists desire to move away from. Rousseau warns his readers that 
“the growth of this kind of injustice would bring about the ruin of the body politic.”17 The 
dissolution of the general will makes the State’s goal of a common good obsolete. Furthermore, 
the absence of shared interest absolves the need for civil society and so too the justification for a 
communal political body. Thus, most modern states are reliant on the perpetuation of their 
foundational myth.  
                                                 
15 Ibid., 15.  
16 Rousseau, The Social, 63-64.  
17 Ibid.  
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Locke goes so far as to establish what Rousseau calls man’s “absolute and naturally 
independent existence” as a “natural liberty” shared by all men.18 The freedom from arbitrary 
rule is a complicated yet essential component of Locke’s social contract theory. He writes that 
“this freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s 
preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together.”19 
Preservation is the end of the Lockean vision of political organization, as with most social 
contract theory. Thus, a government that introduces an “absolute, arbitrary power” into the life of 
its citizens would betray Locke’s social contract. In fact, if the citizen were to accept arbitrary 
power and forfeit his freedom from it, he too would sacrifice his own life. However, the social 
contract that Locke and many others theorize confusingly places demands on its citizens to 
relinquish certain freedoms in exchange for the promise of a freedom that is supposedly secured 
by the protection of a governing entity.  
At this point it is important to question whether social contract theory is practically 
capable of providing a stable foundation for any kind of durable socio-political organization. 
Does social contract theory’s fictional nature threaten the legitimacy of anything grounded in it? 
Moreover, is social contract theory in its abstract or practical form successful in addressing the 
need which brought it into being: threats to political sovereignty?  
Based on the interpretation of various social contract theories and the observation of their 
real-life applications, traditional social contract theory is successful in convincing citizens of the 
fiction that limited freedom guaranteed by governance is worth abdicating their unlimited 
sovereignty for. However, this myth ultimately fails to address the problem of sovereignty 
because the theory itself threatens individual sovereignty. It does so by legitimizing an arbitrary 
                                                 
18 Locke, Second Treatise, 17.  
19 Ibid. 
  12 
authority which regularly challenges a citizen's ability to act in accordance with one’s own 
sovereignty.  
An exploration of Locke’s theory and its influence on the foundation of America helps 
clarify the success, or lack thereof, of the implementation of social contract theory. The first step 
in such a philosophical exploration should be to dissect Locke’s work. By understanding what 
was at stake for Locke, readers gain insight into the aim of his writing, the aim of those who 
appropriate it, and the manifestation of those appropriations.  
As previously stated, Locke’s Second Treatise of Government responds to Sir Robert 
Filmer’s claim that kings have a divine right to rule.20 While his first treatise directly refutes 
Filmer’s theory, his second treatise outlines his vision for civil government. Thus, Locke’s 
theory aims to discredit the arbitrary notion of divine right and set forth a reasoned justification 
for a governing entity’s power. He says that divine right is unreasonable because “it is 
impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow 
of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, Adam’s private dominion 
and paternal jurisdiction.”21 In other words, a divine justification for the right of sovereignty is 
reliant on the arbitrary assumption that the monarch is a direct descendant of God’s first man, 
Adam, to whom he gifted the earth. Locke takes issue with this theory because he believes that 
the hereditary line has become too obscure and, therefore, the bond of power is too weak to 
sustain sovereign authority. Essentially, he argues that the divine right of kings has become an 
unreasoned myth.  
The failure of this method of justification exposes a new need, much like the need for the 
noble lie which bore Plato’s Republic. Locke asserts that he “must of necessity find out another 
                                                 
20 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha (London, England: Richard Chiswell, 1680). 
21 Locke, Second Treatise, 7.  
  13 
rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and 
knowing the persons that have it.”22 The collapse of the sovereign validated by a divine right 
plunges sovereignty into a disoriented state––this is where Locke’s social contract theory 
intervenes. While Filmer’s theory vests sovereign authority in the power of God’s will, Locke 
grounds authority in the sovereignty of the people who are governed by the social contract. In an 
attempt to resolve the arbitrariness of governance, Locke establishes a social contract theory that 
imagines a state of nature, an origin of civil society, and a need which all constitute a reasoned 
government.  
 Locke begins his social contract theory by providing a definition of political power as the 
basis of governance. Political power is an important starting point because it explains the 
transition from natural to artificial authority. One must first understand what political power is 
and how it functions before one can theorize “another way of designing and knowing the persons 
that have it.” Locke defines political power as:  
The right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for 
the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, 
in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the common-wealth from foreign 
injury; and all this only for the public-good.23 
 
This kind of power can be understood as a mutation of the kind of power found within each man 
in nature. This mutation is an artificial one that becomes necessary to achieve what Locke calls 
the “public-good.” This “good,” however, is only relevant in the context of a public domain in 
which a network of citizens is interdependent and exist collectively. The “all this” which 
qualifies political power “is only for” the benefit of society. In other words, political power 
exists only so long as the common-wealth exists.  
                                                 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 8.  
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 However, before the common-wealth, before the need for government, before political 
power, there was the state of nature. Locke argues that  “to understand political power right, and 
derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a 
state of perfect freedom.”24 The emphasis placed on the “perfect freedom” in the state of nature 
acknowledges the existence of imperfect freedom––the freedom presented to the citizen when 
they exit the state of nature and enter civil society. Political power, having “[derived] it from its 
original,” is revealed as the outcome of exchanging perfect freedom for imperfect freedom––the 
state of nature for the state of citizenship. Furthermore, political power reflects onto man the 
sovereignty that he once had in nature which now resides fragmented among the various 
branches of authority in civil society that “[make] laws with penalties of death,” “[regulate and 
preserve] property, and [employ] the force of the community, in the execution of such laws.”25 
 Where political power is exercised in civil society, natural right is enjoyed in the state of 
nature. Locke claims that in nature, men have a God-given right “to order their actions, and 
dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, 
without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”26 The origin of political 
power in natural right is evident. Both displays of agency express a kind of autonomy aimed at 
Locke’s three essentials: life, liberty and estate.27 However, in nature’s state of perfect freedom 
man assumes “an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty” to claim, protect, and preserve 
their life, liberty, and estate. While in civil society, man must rely on the government’s political 
power to do so for them.28  
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 46.  
28 Ibid., 8.  
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 Without government, man in the state of nature solely abides by the law of nature in his 
daily enjoyment of perfect freedom. Locke argues that this law, “obliges every one: and reason 
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession.”29 If this 
natural law should be violated, man possesses in his natural right the “executive power of the law 
of nature” which allows him to punish the violator as he sees fit.30 While this form of self-
governance might appeal to some, Locke shies away from the anarchist state that he has hitherto 
mythologized as the state of nature. Locke, concerned with reason, claims that “it is 
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases . . . therefore God hath certainly appointed 
government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.”31 Here, Locke provides an early 
glimpse at his supposedly more reasonable justification for government: “to restrain the partiality 
and violence of men.”32 Unlike Hobbes, however, the violence of man does not exist in Locke’s 
vision of the state of nature. Government is not established as a method of subduing men but 
rather of preserving them. 
 If we are to question the government that Locke’s social contract justifies, then we must 
also question the specific appeals that he makes to men for its justification. Those appeals are 
essentially life, liberty, and estate. On life, Locke claims that “every man has a property in his 
own person: this nobody has any right to but himself.” Life is the one thing that God gives each 
man that no other man has a right to. Similarly, the liberty of each man is realized, as previously 
mentioned, in the state of perfect freedom that they experience in nature. Estate, on the other 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 9.  
30 Ibid., 12.  
31 Ibid. One could accuse Locke of committing the same crime that he himself accuses Filmer of committing in his 
invocation of God in the appointment of government. However, Locke later attempts to further distance himself and 
his theory from arbitrary power. He also makes a claim that his social contract is not arbitrary because it is grounded 
in popular sovereignty. This argument will be explored and contended later in the chapter.   
32 Ibid.  
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hand, does not exist in nature nor was it gifted to man by God. In fact, God “hath given the world 
to men in common.”33In order to include estate among the rights that appeal to each man, Locke 
works meticulously to fictionalize property as a right that is at risk and worthy of protection. In 
short,  
man, by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or 
labour of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up 
the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention 
and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong 
in common to others.34 
 
Locke manipulates the possession of one’s own body to establish one’s right to private property. 
By identifying labor as an extension of a person into the earth, Locke justifies the separation 
between that which is common and that which is private. Men then come to associate private 
property with the “comfort of his being” or the “conveniences of life.” It is in this way that a 
threat to property becomes a threat to life. Thus, life, liberty, and estate appeal to men, Locke 
claims, because they are inalienable rights. Any threat posed to those rights justifies the 
establishment of a governing entity whose sole aim is preserving them.  
 Once again, unlike Hobbes, Locke believes that the “partiality and violence of men” does 
not exist in the state of nature. One could argue that the introduction of private property, which 
also does not exist in the state of nature, and the introduction of violence coincide in Locke’s 
theory. In response to the fear of violence and a threat against their natural sovereignty, “the 
common-wealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several 
transgressions which they think worthy of . . . any injury done unto any of its members . . . and 
all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is 
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possible.”35 According to Locke, the common-wealth is the first political entity that develops 
outside of the state of nature. In order to join the common-wealth and in order for the common-
wealth to “come by a power,” its members must “quit every one [of] his executive powers of the 
law of nature, and to resign it to the public.”36 Out of a fear for the insecurity of their rights in the 
state of nature, men surrender their sovereignty, join a political society, and forfeit their natural 
power in exchange for the political power of the government.  
 Locke entertains the critique held by some against social contract theory for being 
paradoxical. He poses the question in anticipation of this criticism: “if man in the state of nature 
be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the 
greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom?”37 In other words, why 
would man surrender his freedom in order to be free? He immediately dismisses this concern by 
claiming that man is “constantly exposed to the invasion of others” in the state of nature which 
“makes him willing to quit a condition, which however free, is full of fears and continual dangers 
. . . for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates.”38Although the freedom in 
nature is perfect, it is constantly at risk. The anxiety geared toward a potential threat is so great 
that it drives man to submit himself to a government.  
Locke’s social contract theory relies on the belief that men would prefer imperfect 
freedom so long as it is secure. The fear of losing their perfect freedom at the will of another in 
nature, according to Locke, reasonably explains why   
one unites his person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, by the same he 
unites his possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, 
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person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that common-wealth, 
as long as it hath a being.39 
 
While it should be acknowledged that Locke was aware of the paradox of his social contract, the 
solution or explanation that he offers to abate concern and confusion surrounding it is 
unconvincing. Advocating that man should become “subject to the government and dominion of 
the common-wealth” is a far cry from his original declaration that man has an “undoubted right 
to dominion and sovereignty.” Granted, men enter society for the “enjoyment of their properties 
in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that 
society,” but how enjoyable is the enjoyment of a freedom which was far greater before 
submitting one’s sovereignty to the sovereignty of another?40 Furthermore, how peaceful and 
safe does one truly feel under the authority of another? These are all questions that occupy the 
pages of those who criticize the work of Locke and other traditional social contract theorists.  
Having established the why of social contract theory, Locke then moves to the what––
specifically, what the practical appearance of the social contract should look like as a governing 
entity. Locke reiterates that “the great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-
wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property” in order 
to emphasize how the government protects the rights of men in a way that nature fails to do.41 
Locke orients the government as a solution for the wants that are neglected in nature. These 
“wants” are “an established, settled, known law . . . a known and indifferent judge . . . [and] due 
execution [of the law].”42 It is important to note that the need for an “established law” is only 
brought about because the law of nature cannot govern the unnatural fragmentation of property. 
Furthermore, the need for a judge and an executioner follow the need for said “established law.”  
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Regardless, these wants inspire the government’s end. Locke asserts that these wants are 
the “original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as the 
governments and societies themselves.”43 While the introduction of additional branches of 
government is aimed at more accurately addressing the needs of the people as Locke sees them, 
it further weakens his case against arbitrary power. His primary critique against Filmer is for his 
arbitrary appeal to Scriptures for the legitimization of monarchy, yet Lock’s own theory falls into 
a similar pattern. Additionally, he enacts a secular form of arbitrary power by creating new 
positions and roles of authority. Locke tries to clarify later in the text that “all the power ought 
not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated 
laws.”44 His assertion is that his social contract is conducive to God’s will but, unlike Filmer, it is 
also grounded in the will of the people. By creating known judges, established laws, and an 
authority figure that executes some form of justice, Locke believes that charges of arbitrariness 
against the power created by his social contract are absolved. However, the application of his 
theory proves quite the contrary. Ultimately, the paradox of his theory empties the social contract 
of any reason that Locke attempts to infuse it with.  
While excerpts of Locke’s social contract are cut out and held up as radical liberal 
groundworks, an in-depth and unfragmented reading of the Second Treatise confuses this 
reputation of his writing as well as Locke himself. His work fails to live up to itself. That is, his 
social contract is unable to provide any substantial answers to the question of sovereignty as it 
theoretically sets out to do. Instead, his writing describes a hollow vision of real-world problems 
and practical solutions. It indulges in the tradition of social contract theory in the way that it 
synthesizes the complexities of life in order to make its problems diagnosable and therefore 
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solvable. Furthermore, later appropriations of Locke’s theory to practical governance expose the 
disparity between his suspended mythical solution and contemporary reality.   
 Much of Louis Hartz’s work establishes Locke as a key, if not primary, influence upon 
the constitution of America’s government––specifically in its embodiment of liberalism. Hartz 
describes America in his book on The Liberal Tradition in America as “a society which begins 
with Locke, and thus transforms him, [and] stays with Locke, by virtue of an absolute and 
irrational attachment it develops for him.”45 Critics of Locke often downplay his theory’s role in 
America’s founding. Hartz’s interpretation of America, however, is exclusively Lockean. 
America’s transformation of Locke and “irrational attachment” to him will be later evaluated, but 
America as it “begins” in relation to Locke must first be addressed. One of the most recognizable 
applications of Locke’s theory in America’s foundation is in The Declaration of Independence. 
Thomas Jefferson echoes Locke in his claim that, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that 
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”46 Although Jefferson famously 
replaces Locke’s claim of the right to estate with an even more ambiguous right to “pursue 
happiness,” Locke’s influence on the document, and more broadly on America’s Founding 
Fathers, is evident.  
 Although he supports Locke’s theory, and clearly asserts the prevalence of it in 
America’s historical framework, Hartz does not hesitate to locate failings in its practical 
manifestations. In fact, according to Hartz, America “at the bottom is riddled with paradox.”47 
The most notable failing that he addresses in The Liberal Tradition in America is that of 
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sovereignty. In describing the idiosyncrasies of America, he says that “it has a quiet, matter of 
fact quality, it does not understand the meaning of sovereign power, the bourgeois class passion 
is scarcely present, the sense of the past is altered, and there is about it all, as compared with the 
European pattern, a cast and almost charming innocence of mind.”48 That “innocence of mind” is 
due to what Hartz describes as a bypassing of the struggle for sovereignty. America, “compared 
with the European pattern,” evades a history, specifically a feudal one, in which sovereignty is 
repeatedly used against the people of a country by those who govern it. American liberalism is 
born out of a distinctly Lockean tradition in which sovereignty is assumed to be vested within 
each citizen at birth. Thus, Hartz argues, the American social contract is built upon a paradox in 
which its citizens cling to something that they do not and cannot fully understand.  
 Richard Aaron, another defender of Locke, also identifies the ambiguity of sovereignty as 
a downfall of Locke’s social contract. He writes that “a question of considerable difficulty which 
now arises is that as to sovereignty” and asks “who is sovereign in Locke’s state?”49 This 
suggests that countries, specifically America, that were founded upon Locke’s theory find 
themselves constantly having to confront the question of sovereignty which has previously been 
set forth in this project: who has it and who ought to have it? This question becomes increasingly 
more difficult when, as Hartz suggests, the people who are tasked with answering it do “not 
understand the meaning of sovereign power.” 
Aaron doesn’t stop there with his critique of Lockean sovereignty. He further argues that 
“Locke’s political theory is devoid of any clear-cut theory of sovereignty.”50 This is exacerbated 
by the very fragmentation of power that occurs in the creation of a legislative and executive 
power that was previously highlighted. Locke seems confused by his own attempt to assert the 
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power of each branch. For example, Locke says that the “legislative is not only the supreme 
power of the common-wealth, but sacred and unaltered in the hands where the community once 
placed it.”51 Although he acknowledges that the community was once the authority that founded 
it, it is now “sacred and unalterable.” Additionally, the executive has the sovereignty to execute 
the laws which the legislative sets forth. Thus, the legislative is limited in its ability to fully 
realize the authority of their power in law. Sovereignty gets further confused when Locke insists 
that “the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts 
and designs of any body, even their legislators.”52 Each power being supreme is incompatible 
and impossible. Aaron is right to question the location of sovereignty in Locke’s state.  
 Aaron also recognizes that the powers that come out of Locke’s theory are arbitrary 
because the foundations upon which they were created are fictitious. He says that,  
moreover, it cannot be denied that [Locke] deals too frequently in artificialities. His 
individual is artificial. He has no family ties . . . So also Locke’s state is artificial. It is a 
community of free and independent individuals bound together by a compact into which 
they have entered freely for the better security of their lives, liberties, and estates––and 
nothing more.53  
 
While Locke seems perfectly content with the grounding of authority in “nothing more” than the 
compact as a way of ridding his social contract of arbitrariness, Aaron is less than satisfied. 
Modern debates that continue to grapple with the inconsistencies of America’s foundation seem 
to support Aaron’s discontent.  
 J. G. A. Pocock, however, charges Aaron with misconstruing Locke’s theory. Despite 
illuminating various failings of Locke’s social contract, Pocock dismisses Aaron’s defenses of 
Locke as “a classic instance of the substitution of philosophical for historical explanation that 
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sometimes ensues.”54 According to Pocock, Aaron engages in the same act of distortion that 
Locke employs in his social contract: equating philosophy with history.55 This judgment stems 
from Pocock’s assertion that Locke’s liberal influence––that is, his vision of natural rights, 
consensual governance, and popular sovereignty––has had a limited influence on American 
history. Pocock’s rejection of Locke’s theory as a real “piece of history” is in clear opposition to 
Hartz’s interpretation of Locke and the tradition of American liberalism.56 Furthermore, through 
this critique, Pocock claims that the American tradition is actually one of republicanism not 
liberalism as many Locke supporters contend.57 Ultimately, Hartz, Aaron, and Pocock all engage 
in similar attempts to correct interpretations of history that conflict with their understanding of 
modernity and the ways in which American society arrived at its present moment. This debate is 
unsettled among scholars and reflects uncertainty about America both in its theoretical roots and 
in its practical appearance. The various ways in which Locke’s theory is exposed as being 
contradictory, by his supporters and critics alike, speak to the fictionality and unreliability of 
social contract theory itself.  
 On top of being susceptible to incompatible interpretations, social contract theory is also 
prone to inconsistent applications. One of the most antithetical uses of Locke’s words was 
committed by Locke himself in his contribution to the Fundamental Constitutions of the 
Carolina colony. The inconsistency between his biography and his alleged liberal agenda further 
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disorients Locke’s social contract theory. David Armitage argues that Locke is “a crucial link in 
the historical chain joining liberalism with colonialism.”58 His authorship of the founding 
document is significant because it is a practical betrayal of Locke’s own political philosophy. In 
his service as secretary to the Proprietor of the province of Carolina, Earl of Shaftesbury, Locke 
helped create a feudal aristocracy as well as sanction one form of absolute authority. Despite 
debunking any kind of absolute power other than that of each man in his Second Treatise of 
Government, Locke contradicts himself by institutionalizing the subjection of individuals in 
Carolina’s constitutional framework. In the Fundamental Constitutions, Locke writes that 
“‘every freeman of Carolina shall have absolute power and Authority over his Negro slaves, of 
what opinion or religion so ever.’”59 There exists a fundamental inconsistency between the 
liberalism presented in the Second Treatise of Government and in Locke’s later governing 
practices. This inconsistency uncoincidentally hinges on sovereignty.60   
   While Armitage identifies Locke as a hypocrite and his writing as unequivocally 
colonial, others locate those who appropriate Locke as the true sources of offense.61 Regardless, 
the many paradoxes examined thus far, specifically those surrounding sovereignty, bare the 
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moral consequences of Locke’s social contract theory. The social contract’s ambiguous treatment 
of sovereignty enables the manipulation of it toward malicious ends. By inventing sovereignty as 
both essential to man and essential to governance, Locke weakens his own noble lie. Whether 
you believe that the interpretation of Locke as a racist colonizer emerges from his own theory or 
from other people’s utilizations of it, the very real ways in which his writing has been, and still 
is, used to subjugate certain individuals is undeniable.  
One example of this is John Norris’ invocation of the authority that Locke places in the 
people to overthrow an unjust government in defense of South Carolina’s rebellion against the 
Fundamental Constitution.62 This appropriation is ironic because it pits Locke against himself. 
His words in the Second Treatise are weaponized against his words in the Fundamental 
Constitutions by people like John Norris who viewed the founding document as a source of 
tyrannical subjugation against the people of South Carolina. South Carolina, of course, would go 
on to become the first state to secede from the Union due to an attachment to pro-slavery 
sentiments. Another example is the appropriation of Locke to justify a defense for antebellum 
race relations in the South. Southerner Thomas Dew proclaimed that “even Locke . . . admits the 
right to make slaves of prisoners whom we might just have killed.”63 One could dismiss these 
applications of Locke’s theory as mere misinterpretations. However, James Farr is adamant in 
arguing that the high degree of variation among the ends to which Locke’s theory has been 
applied suggests that the theory itself is ambiguous enough to encourage these “ironic 
appropriations.”64 While the theory itself is neither especially harmful nor has mal-intent, its 
practical application to society has established Locke’s social contract as deeply problematic.  
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Contemporary material examples of Locke’s theory in practice don’t always explicitly 
accredit the writer or his work. Instead, attachments to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” have become subliminally ingrained throughout America’s collective political 
imagination. An example of this is modern cases in which the “stand-your-ground law” is used to 
justify murder. This law assumes an individual’s right to defend themselves or others when 
confronted with a perceived threat by whatever means necessary, even deadly force. It also relies 
heavily on sentiments expressed in Locke’s work that establish the threat to one’s life––either 
bodily or by proxy through property––so great an offense that it warrants an individual’s 
punishment of another individual with death.65 The likes of George Zimmerman, Michael 
Drejka, and too many more unknowingly benefit from the political mythology created by Locke. 
On a legislative level, Locke’s social contract justifies this form of self-defense which is legal in 
over half of the United States. On a psychological level, Locke’s theory participates in a tradition 
that has perpetually conditioned the minds of people like Zimmerman and Drejka to believe that 
it is their inalienable right to defend themselves, that they will not be punished for killing 
someone while doing so, and that they should value their life and sovereignty over those of an 
other. Despite not expressly citing Locke in stand-your-ground laws, lawmakers, law enforcers, 
and killers alike still engage in similar controversial manipulations of Locke’s theory as did 
Norris and Dew. 
It is in these ways that Locke’s social contract theory fails to address the need which 
brought it into being. Instead of answering the question of sovereignty, Locke’s theory and its 
later manifestations have further confused it. Instead of asking “who has it and who ought to 
have it?” of sovereignty, one might find themselves now asking “what even is it?” or “will I ever 
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have it?” –– “can it even be had?” By attaching it to a mythological conception of how the world 
is and how it ought to be, Locke and other traditional social contract theorists lose sovereignty 
amidst the various systems of authority and fiction that they create in order to justify their 
philosophies. Sustaining the fiction replaces sovereignty as the main concern and, once again, the 
contents of the fictions become less important than the role of the fictions themselves.  
Modern political philosophers are tasked with retroactively patching the holes left in 
political organizations by traditional social contract theory and theorists. In the meantime, an 
individual might look elsewhere for answers to the question of sovereignty. One potential answer 
can be found in the philosophical, and oftentimes erotic, work of Georges Bataille. Bataille 
writes outside of the tradition of social contract theory in order to conceptualize of ways in which 
an individual can engage in sovereign acts in order to harness their freedom instead of relying on 
the fictional sovereignty promised by external systems of authority.  
 Discovering new and unfamiliar locations of sovereignty is necessary in a present 
historical moment in which individual lives are inextricable from their political significance. 
However precariously, we live within the various social contracts that we are born into. Some 
might seek refuge from the weight of living a lie by attempting to return to the state of nature. 
Others seek loopholes or gaps––spaces of excess––within the prevailing order in which the 
mythical world is mediated by the material world and true sovereignty, unrestricted sovereignty, 
is rendered attainable.  
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Reorienting Sovereignty: From Social Contract to Sovereign Acts 
“Keep your mind in hell, and despair not.”  
––Gillian Rose, Love's Work 
 
 
 Sovereignty is a pervasive concept within the tradition of Western political thought. This 
is evident in works ranging from Plato’s location of sovereignty in the individual who is free of 
bodily need and thus free to pursue the objective good in relation to the polis, to Rousseau’s 
theory of popular sovereignty which vests authority in the general will, to Locke’s assertion that 
the sovereignty of the State is rooted in the sovereignty of the people who authorize it.66 Carl 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as the ability to disregard normative power structures and 
practice authority autonomously is widely accepted by Western political theorists.67 This 
definition, however, becomes complicated by the word’s application and varied use throughout 
the tradition of social contract theory. An investigation into sovereignty first requires the 
identification of the problem of sovereignty that each philosopher’s theory, specifically their 
practical definition and vision of its implementation, aims to solve.  
Within social contract theory, the problem of sovereignty is often framed as a 
fundamental tension between those who possess sovereignty and those who are subject to the 
sovereignty of another. For Plato this tension is between the unjust man and the just man, while 
for both Rousseau and Locke it is between the monarch and the citizens. The solutions set forth 
by traditional social contract theorists tend to take the shape of a governing entity, such as 
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Plato’s philosopher king, Rousseau’s general will, and Locke’s representative government. 
However, the arbitrary introduction of authority, and thus new forms of sovereignty, only 
perpetuates the very problem of sovereignty. Instead of relieving the tension of sovereign power, 
the solutions introduce artificial explanations and, in turn, lose their grasp of reality.  
In other words, traditional social contract theory is not successful in solving the problem 
of sovereignty because its solutions include in themselves a paradox: sovereignty vs. freedom. 
Sovereignty is often presented in social contract theory as a decision. Individuals are given a 
choice between sovereignty, complete self-governance, and freedom, which might be defined as 
the absence of or liberation from the threat of another. Sovereignty offers the individual a life 
free of restriction but remains in danger of the sovereignty of another. This choice leaves the 
individual free from the bounds of institutional safety but also exposes them to the unrestricted 
will of other sovereigns. By choosing freedom, the individual accepts a limited version of 
autonomy which is reliant on and mediated by the sovereignty of a supposedly protective 
governing body. The problem of sovereignty presents itself in most traditional solutions as 
resolved through the decision made by a political subject as a means to meet a need. This 
solution is mythological.  
While some social contract theories are built upon concepts of a state of nature, this 
chapter will set out to explore an alternative theory of sovereignty generated by French 
philosopher and writer Georges Bataille’s economy of excess. Bataille’s economy is founded 
within society in order to think through experiences of human anxiety and responds to the need 
for political organization. His political theory works to question the mediated forms of 
sovereignty and the appearance of institutional life that is set forth by traditional social contract 
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theorists.68 It breaks through the myth of the social contract by grounding itself in the realities of 
every man. 
Bataille’s general economy accounts for a share of unattributed human energy and 
advocates for its expenditure on “useless” and classically extra-political sovereign acts. While 
traditional social contract theory’s solution focuses on the individual in relation to the State, 
Bataille envisions the individual as essentially political; attaining within them the ability to 
access sovereignty at any moment under any circumstance. Bataille’s solution focuses on the 
expenditure of human energy and the ways in which this expense can be reoriented to contest 
contemporary systems of power.  
In The Accursed Share, Bataille outlines his political economy in three volumes. The first 
volume, Consumption, establishes what he means by “economy” and how a scientific method of 
exchange can be applied to human interaction and life. It is in this volume where he suspends the 
notion that one should be driven by fear of scarcity and instead advocates for luxurious motives. 
The second volume, The History of Eroticism, puts Sade in conversation with theology to set 
forth a vision of liberation at the hands of love and the erotic. Within these luxurious acts he 
locates moments of sovereignty. The third volume, Sovereignty, uses the other two volumes to 
develop the sovereign as someone who rejects the restrictiveness of the objective world and 
freely pursues desire.  
 Bataille’s theory unfolds in medias res, in that it uses the institutions which have already 
been theorized by and erected in response to the work of traditional social contract theory in 
order to conceptualize his own political philosophy. Unlike social contract theorists of the past, 
Bataille’s theory does not aim to vindicate governance. Rather, it navigates the political 
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individual through the unease which drives them and around the institutions which limit them in 
order to reclaim sovereignty. This approach is especially pointed considering what was at stake 
for Bataille during his writing process. The Accursed Share was written and published in a post-
World War II European political climate. In his work, Bataille reflects on the rise and spread of 
fascism in the mid-20th century, specifically in relations to the ways in which governing entities 
fail the citizens whose interests they claim to represent.  
By enacting excess energy and spending it luxuriously, the political individual is able to 
momentarily reject the prevailing forms of authority and reclaim sovereignty in the space opened 
up by their absence. Bataille appropriately names this excess energy the “accursed share.” The 
share’s undetermined expenditure damns it to liminality and grants it its accursed status. 
However, both Bataille’s economy and his definition of sovereignty are reliant on the 
presupposed existence of the notion of surplus. This implies that within man exists a set pool of 
energy from which shares are divvied up and predestined. The accursed share, Bataille’s 
potential solution to the problem of sovereignty, depends upon the language that the social 
contract invents in order to perpetuate its mythological origins. Nonetheless, Bataille sets out to 
overcome the very intelligible form to which his written work is unavoidably bound.  
 In order to evaluate whether or not Bataille’s economy is successful in mitigating the 
problem of sovereignty despite its precarious expression, one must first understand the economy 
and all of its parts which allow it to function. Consumption plays a key role in Bataille’s general 
economy. According to Bataille, consumption is one of the human activities that is distorted by 
organized life. His general economy reverts the traditional economic motivation of scarcity and 
instead strives for waste. He explains that his economy is, “the general movement of exudation 
(of waste) of living matter [which] impels [man] . . . [H]is sovereignty in the living world 
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identifies him with this movement; it destines him, in a privileged way, to that glorious 
operation, to useless consumption.”69 The act of consuming luxuriously or wastefully marks a 
sovereign in Bataille’s theory. This “wasteful” consumption acts in opposition to that of utility.  
Consumption becomes a means rather than a luxury in organized life. Usefulness is 
invented by authority figures to perpetuate the myth of political hierarchy. Thus, the need which 
drives consumption also serves as the need for governance. Bataille understands this need as a 
constructed notion which is dangled before the political individual in order to organize and 
mediate the expenditure of their energy. Bataille acknowledges that “humanity exploits given 
material resources, but by restricting them as it does to a resolution of the immediate difficulties 
it encounters (a resolution which it has hastily had to define as an ideal), it assigns to the forces it 
employs an end which they cannot have.”70 The “end” which “they,” humans, “cannot have” is 
unattainable because it is an artificial construction and thus limited by man’s ignorance. Men 
require material things for basic functioning, eating, drinking, shelter, and so on, but their 
consumption of materials to reach an ideal end––their restriction of the earth for some arbitrary 
greater cause––is misled.  
Bataille sees that humans limit and prohibit the materiality of nature by making it 
“useful” in order to resolve the “difficulties,” anxieties, fears, of unorganized life. By distorting 
consumption as a means of resolution, an individual’s energy is manipulated as a tool for 
achieving the “ideal.” For example, the transformation of consumption and utilization of nature 
is emphasized by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government. The invented utility is an 
extension, or rather a mutation, of the aforementioned bodily needs. In his work, Locke says that 
the conversion of nature into private property is justified because, “the earth, and all that is 
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therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of their being.”71 This type of sustaining 
consumption exists in the shares of energy which would not be considered accursed by Bataille. 
However, the artificial expansion of the term “utility” occurs in response to the practice of 
accumulating these life sustaining natural goods beyond basic need.  
This consumption constructs the need for an early type of exchange-based market and, as 
Locke goes on to argue, a need for government. This excess is mitigated by the arbitrary 
assignment of value to other natural resources, “and thus came in the use of money, some lasting 
thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men would take in 
exchange for the truly useful, but perishable supports of life.”72 Money, markets, and 
government all represent ways in which humans consume and create toward an arbitrary end. 
They are justified by a mythic need which propels them toward some intangible and nebulous 
goal. The introduction of these regulatory institutions also ushers in newly invented laws and 
limitations.  
Living in a state of prohibition, man comes to accept façades of values which are also 
deemed as “useful,” such as justice and freedom, guaranteed to him as inalienable rights. These 
values, however, are systematized. They are based on necessity not desire and on utility instead 
of pleasure. Man, in submitting himself to these mediated forms, dilutes their possibilities. For 
example, the political subject accepts a precarious form of freedom in exchange for the State’s 
promise of justice. Bataille states that, for anyone living  
under the mask of justice, it is true that general freedom takes on the lackluster and 
neutral appearance of existence subjected to the necessities: If anything, it is a narrowing 
of limits to what is most just; it is not a dangerous breaking-loose, a meaning that the 
word has lost. It is a guarantee against the risk of servitude, not a will to assume those 
risks without which there is no freedom.73 
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Justice is useful to the State because it sets limits and boundaries in society which further work 
to perpetuate the mythic ideal. Freedom, then, is gestated as yet another restriction aimed at 
narrowing the appearance of reality and the collective political imagination.74 For example, the 
American Constitution introduces and preserves an individual who is vested with a freedom that 
allows them to pursue the universe as it was envisioned by the Founding Fathers. Bataille, 
pushing against the work perpetually done by the Constitution, would argue that American 
citizens and their “freedom” are actually restrained by the State which they so ardently preserve.  
American citizens are ascribed a set of rights which protect their freedom, further 
delimiting what it means to be free. The Second Amendment, on the freedom to bear arms, states 
that, “a well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”75 This freedom, set forth in 1789, is 
rooted in the need for an effective military to protect the State. Freedom, like consumption, has 
been distorted to inspire political subjects to strive toward the mythic ideal.  
Present day confusion and animosity incited by the invocation of this freedom exposes 
the artificial fragility of the freedom itself. Without the need for civilian engagement in war, the 
freedom to bear arms is found void. The amendment now exists as a remnant of the condition of 
society in a historical moment which found utility in arming citizens. Further examination into 
this use of freedom as a momentary political solution exposes the tensions that arise when 
authority is arbitrarily introduced. This is precisely where traditional social contract theory’s 
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solution fails to solve the problem of sovereignty. In the American Founding Fathers’ attempt to 
mitigate the tension between the sovereign and those who were subject to him, they founded a 
new system of power which equally threatens a citizen’s autonomy, albeit not as overtly.  
The pushback in response to modern attempts of gun regulation is representative of 
Bataille’s assertion that the linguistic distortion of words for utility's sake results in a hollow or 
“lackluster” appearance of freedom presented to the people who claim it. Freedom is paradoxical 
in definition and use. Bataille hints at this in his disappointment in the “meaning that the word 
has lost.” Freedom comes from two Old English roots, “free” and “-dom.” “Free” comes from 
the Old English “freo” which means “not in bondage” or “acting of one's own will," and comes 
from a Proto-Germanic word, friaz, meaning “beloved” or “not in bondage.” It is derived from a 
Proto-Indo-European root, “-pri,” “to love.”76 The etymological and cultural transformation of 
language, which once expressed the act of loving and now comes to describe one who is 
unbound, can be traced back to the differentiation between those who were enslaved and those 
who were not––those who were objectified as tools working toward an end and those we were 
the family or loved ones of the slave owner.  
The second half of the word, “dom,” as a suffix comes from the Old English “dom” 
which  means “statute” or “judgement.” Ironically, “dom” as an independent word went on to 
form the Middle English word, “doome,” later “doom,” which means "a decision determining 
fate or fortune, irrevocable destiny."77 While freedom has come to promise a “guarantee against 
the risk of servitude,” its origins lie in the judgement of loving; this will have greater 
implications for Bataille’s vision of a return to sovereignty. By appropriating freedom as a 
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political right, the State dooms its citizens to a precarious subjectivity constantly needing to be 
externally qualified by the State itself.  
 Bataille argues that political entities which propagate a mythic ideal, which promise their 
citizens a shallow form of freedom, fail to embrace nature in any fulfilling way. The State is 
essentially and intentionally limited by its reliance on artificial utility. As previously stated, its 
very origins are based on an anxiety induced need. Therefore, “the State cannot in any way use 
up that part of ourselves that comes into play in eroticism or in individual love, for it cannot rise 
above interest (the generality of interest), and a share of ourselves (precisely the accursed share) 
cannot in any way be given within the limits of interest.”78 Here, Bataille asserts that the State 
cannot provide an outlet for the excess energy which inevitably builds up in man. The State’s 
attempts to rechannel man’s sovereign compulsion to consume wastefully and desire freely are 
unsuccessful. Ultimately, governing entities are unwilling and unable to provide man with the 
type of catharsis granted by sovereign acts like death, love, and eroticism.79  
 After exploring the efforts and failures of the work done by traditional social contract 
theory, Bataille presents his understanding of sovereignty. He momentarily sets aside state 
sovereignty and the sovereignty traditionally used to discuss international relations. Instead he 
says that he, “speak[s] in general of an aspect that is opposed to the servile and the 
subordinate.”80 A sovereign does not serve at the pleasure of others but instead indulges in the 
pleasures of himself. Additionally, their actions are not executed out of necessity but out of 
desire. Based on the investigation conducted thus far on the manipulation of freedom, Bataille 
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seems to use the word “sovereignty” to describe the state which has previously been called 
“freedom.” His dismissal of “freedom” as a term is largely due to its weaponization by authority 
figures. By swapping “freedom” for “sovereignty” Bataille reinstates the autonomous power 
which was robbed from the political individual when they entered into a social contract.  
Bataille works to reestablish the sovereign outside of a state of usefulness. For, “life 
beyond utility is the domain of sovereignty.”81 In that liminal state, one is able to experience 
sovereignty in joy, satisfaction, satiation as he is consumed by the moment of being rather than 
the anxiety that accompanies need. Utility, according to Bataille, distracts from the present 
moment by prioritizing the result of consumption rather than the act of consumption itself. In 
contrast, “what is sovereign in fact is to enjoy the present time without having anything else in 
view but this present time.”82 The freedom to live in the moment is that of a sovereign alone. In 
not having to contemplate a time beyond the present, the sovereign is freed from the need to 
know.  
Knowing, operating within a paradigm of knowledge that is oriented toward the utility of 
knowing, prompts striving toward that end goal. Once the end of any given knowledge is 
achieved another round of knowing commences and the knower is tempted to engage in an 
infinite repetition of thought. Bataille asserts that, “knowledge is never sovereign: to be 
sovereign it would have to occur in a moment,” however, “the moment remains outside, short of 
or beyond, all knowledge.”83 How does one reach that moment? How does one break the cycle of 
knowledge to fully be pleased by the present moment? In order to isolate one’s knowledge to that 
of the present moment, one must engage in the act of unknowing according to Bataille.  
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Bataille and Schmitt’s shared geo-political context inspires an urgency to unknow in both 
of their philosophies on sovereignty. They both use their work to grapple with the changing 
political landscape of Europe in the mid-20th century. In his pre-war critique of liberalism and 
advocacy for dictatorship, Schmitt presents his definition of sovereignty as, “sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception.”84 Furthermore, “what characterizes an exception is principally 
unlimited authority, which means the suspension of the entire existing order.”85 Although 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty demands a similar act of shedding the objective world as 
Bataille’s, his vision of sovereignty remains in the organized political realm. Their linguistic 
understandings of sovereignty overlap, but Bataille rejects the dictatorial ideology endorsed by 
Schmitt by locating sovereignty in each individual rather than solely in one.   
Acts of unknowing come about during events or experiences that rob us of our 
knowledge. During these moments, what we know ceases to be of importance and we are briefly 
suspended in an instance of unfamiliarity. Bataille muses that 
this is the case if we weep, if we sob, if we laugh till we gasp. It’s not so much that the 
burst of laughter or tears stops thought. It’s really the object of the laughter, or the object 
of the tears, that suppresses thought, that takes all knowledge away from us. The laughter 
or the tears break out in the vacuum of thought created by their object in the mind.86 
 
These moments of weeping, sobbing, laughing, and so on, create a sovereign by forcing a person 
out of their thoughts and into their body. After doing the work of suspension, the object of the 
weep, the sob, the laugh, disappears for that moment and allows us to exist in a temporary 
subjective state. It is in that state where utility ceases to be and sovereignty is displayed.  
 By forcing the sovereign to unknow their context, the moment and the sovereign exist 
free of anticipation. Anticipation, in many ways, binds us to knowledge. It is, “precisely in the 
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miracle, we are thrust from our anticipation of the future into the presence of the moment, of the 
moment illuminated by a miraculous light, the light of the sovereignty of life delivered from its 
servitude.”87 If we expect something to happen at any given time we wait for it, we hope for it, 
we dread it. We are taken out of the moment by this hope and dread and, in turn, act in service to 
the pleasure of socialized time and space. Our actions become utilitarian to meet the ends of this 
anticipation. By rejecting knowledge, utility, and anticipation, the individual lifts the weight 
placed upon their sovereignty by objective life.  
This new unrestricted sovereign, according to Bataille, is now free to live in the domain 
of excess. This freedom, unbound by past and future knowledge, allows the sovereign to 
participate in acts of deviance. Bataille says that, “often the incipient transgression develops into 
an unbounded transgression: the disappointed anticipation heralds the reign of the moment, 
clearing the way for sexual disorder and violence, for revelry and frantic squander” and it is, “in 
this way, [that] sovereignty celebrates its marriage with death.”88 As these unbound moments 
create a sovereign, they also create unbound behaviors. Without anticipation for what might be, 
the sovereign engages in acts that further work to disrupt objective life. According to Bataille, 
these acts pursue a cathartic void by seeking annihilation.  
While the embrace of death offers a path to sovereignty for Bataille, he also proposes 
“life-creating” acts of sovereign making in love and in the erotic. These are both forms of 
consumption that the individual can engage in in order to invoke sovereignty. They do so by 
breaking the individual boundaries which constrain the self and allow the other in. While the 
erotic, that which is raw and tabooed, elicits the moment of a gasp, love breaks down historically 
formed social barriers and opens up space for unconstrained erotic pleasure. Bataille says that, 
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“in actual fact, individual love, precisely in that it doesn’t involve society but only the individual, 
is the least historical thing in the world.”89 The experience of love forces the individual to 
unknow the objective world around them because it constructs a wholly new world, a world 
between the individual and their loved one. According to Bataille, love, like anger, is a disruptive 
force. It is both constitutive and destructive.  
Gillian Rose’s autobiographical contemplation on life, love, and death provides deeper 
insight for our understanding of the work that love does in Bataille’s theory. Both Rose and 
Bataille formulate their theories of love with Hegel as a primary influence. Love, according to 
Rose, “commands the complete unveiling of the eyes, the transparency of the body.”90 A loving 
relationships serves as a space in which a subject is confronted by the other and is plunged into 
disorientation by the recognition of a self existent outside of their self. Love demands that the 
loved ones see the other not as a body in relation to its positionality in objective life but rather as 
a subject suspended by love’s work.  
The subject is rendered vulnerable because they are at risk of unrecognition and, in turn, 
annihilation at the hands of their loved one. Rose asserts that, “there is no democracy in any love 
relation: only mercy” and “to be at someone’s mercy is dialectical damage.”91 Similar to Bataille, 
Rose identifies a loving relationship outside of the bounds of organized power relations, such as 
democracy. The power enacted in a loving relationship is a precarious one. Not only is an 
individual in love at the mercy of their loved one’s power but also the possibility of losing their 
love and the power that it gives them. Rose poetically proclaims that  
a crisis of illness, bereavement, separation, natural disaster, could be the opportunity to 
make contact with deeper levels of the terrors of the soul, to loose and to bind, to bind 
and to loose. A soul which is not bound is as mad as one with cemented boundaries. To 
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grow in love-ability is to accept the boundaries of oneself and others. While remaining 
vulnerable, woundable, around the bounds.92 
 
By embracing the dialectical damage that accompanies a loving relationship, the subject 
experiences a constant loosening and binding of their soul. In other words, they are drawn into a 
perennial state of becoming. Love works to reorient the world around us in a way that forces us 
to reconsider the self and the ways in which we reckon with subjectivity, engage with the world 
around us, and spend our energy.  
Meaning, which had previously been informed by history, the State, and external 
authorities, is now derived from the recognition achieved between the self and the other. The 
ideal fed to the individual by the State is no longer relevant; “in other words, in both individual 
love and impersonal eroticism, man is immediately in the universe.”93 Bataille understands that 
man, through the State, attempts to approach the universe as an individual. While in love, they 
become the universe with their partner. Love is one of the forces which works to reject the 
symbolic order, releases the individual from the bonds of conditioned being, and makes way for 
the mediation of sovereign desire.  
 The suspension of language is one way through which the individual can reject their 
political significance within the social contract. Oftentimes, moments in which words fail work 
to open up spaces of catharsis. In silence the individual isolates themselves from the history of 
meaning and the implications that language carries with it. Expressions of subjectivity can then 
be achieved by other means, specifically those of eroticism. Eroticism in boundless relationships 
provides a gateway through which the individual is able to disengage from the historical world 
and enter the universal one:  
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Only eroticism is capable, in silence and transgression, of admitting the lovers into the 
void where even the mumbling is stopped, where no speech is conceivable, where it is no 
longer just the other but rather the bottomlessness and boundlessness of the universe that 
is designated by the embrace.94 
 
In eroticism, the individual spends energy to its extreme. It is in the testing of their energy’s 
limits that they experience the gasp, the climax, the universe. The “boundless” quality which was 
lost in the meaning of freedom during its redefinition and utilization by the State is rediscovered 
in individual erotic acts and, as its etymological root might suggest, in loving.  
 Having established what threatens sovereignty and what has the potential ability to 
rejuvenate it, Bataille delves into a deeper analysis of the historical implication of sovereignty 
among men in common. As he understands it, “of course, sovereignty––in a practical sense, the 
use of resources for nonproductive ends––cannot be given as the goal of history . . . that goal is 
perhaps, on the contrary, classless society; classless society is at least the direction that history 
has taken in our time.”95 Bataille’s assessment of progress through a historical lens is evidently 
informed by Karl Marx’s political philosophy.96 Sovereignty, within Bataille’s framework, 
cannot be envisioned in history because it does not have language or meaning to conceptualize it. 
He argues that sovereignty comes into being only when history is negated. A classless society is, 
in theory, an achievable goal because its essence is able to be captured by conventional uses of 
language.   
 When addressing the goal of classless society, Bataille echoes Marx. He claims that, “in 
becoming, by means of an all-around qualification, a fulfillment of the thing, a perfection of 
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utility, hence of servility, [man] stops being reducible to a particular element, as things are.”97 
Man escapes alienation by embracing his utility and sees his being reflected in the products of 
his labor. This assertion builds upon Hegel’s dialectic.98 Although it seems contradictory, by 
embracing negation and focusing on his labor, the individual is consumed by the present rather 
than anticipating the future. This argument, however, complicates Bataille’s theory as it seems to 
embrace the utility which he has thus far worked to challenge.  
 Ultimately, for Bataille, the cathartic converse of consuming luxuriously is the 
engagement in war. War is the utilitarian expenditure of the accursed share of energy which, in 
its result of death, has the capacity to both propel history and return man to the condition of the 
life that he is risking. Bataille concludes that Stalin, Marx and Helmuth von Moltke, the German 
and Prussian military chief, all operated under one assumption: “that war was the motor of 
history, and without war the world would stagnate.”99 By participating in a war, the State 
allocates its citizens excess energy for them––in acts of violence or in emotional and laborious 
preoccupations necessary only during wartime. War reaffirms the need for governance. It 
perpetuates the myth that a citizen is constantly in danger and in need of external protection.  
The fear of stagnating, of being negated, is so great that it triggers within the State and its 
citizens a fervent reclamation of the “freedom” which is threatened by war––that is the freedom 
to live, the freedom of sovereignty. However, also in war, “modern man is brought back to what 
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is at stake which he avoided seeing and which only emerges from the suddenness of the 
moment.”100 Tragically, or rather ironically, one of the most pervasive outcomes of war also 
happens to be one of the returns to sovereignty that Bataille envisions: annihilation. While war 
spends a citizen’s energy on activities based on their utility, they are still confronted with the 
desires only fulfilled by luxury. The mass mortality of war brings the gasp to the citizen’s lips 
and the evidence of their being to their conscience. Annihilation takes them out of a future 
oriented utilitarian life and into one that focuses on their present material moment. With war as 
its alternative, Bataille makes a convincing argument for the personal reclamation of sovereignty 
by means of love, eroticism, and a reconciliation with the fear of death 
Adriana Cavarero invokes Bataille in her ontological research on death and the State 
which she conducts in Horrorism.101 Her use of Bataille is in direct response to Hannah Arendt’s 
discussion of the atrocities committed by Nazi Germany during World War II in her work on The 
Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt’s critique of Bataille, although largely interpreted as a 
misunderstanding by Cavarero, lies in his “think[ing] it superficial to dwell on horrors.”102 
Arendt misreads Bataille’s criticism of organized society’s aversion to disgust. While Bataille 
disregards the experience of disgust as a socialized emotional response toward that which is 
unknown or outside the realm of desirability, Arendt claims that this dismissive attitude toward 
horror ignores the implications of violence and the lives lost during horrific events, such as the 
Holocaust. 
 Cavarero emphasizes the tension between Arendt and Bataille, specifically in their shared 
post-war context and their varied approaches toward understanding the events of war. She says 
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that, “for Arendt, there is an alarming continuity between the post-1918 stance promoting the 
sacrificability of the self and the theses expounded at the end of the 1940s by Bataille.”103 Thus, 
an Arendtian reading of Bataille evokes concern surrounding his desensitization toward human 
violence. She goes so far as to suggest that mentalities like the one expressed in Bataille’s 
writing lead to and allowed for the violence against Jews during World War II to be committed.  
However, differing from Arendt, Cavarero finds value in Bataille’s unique conception of 
sovereignty through a kind of death wish. She outlines Bataille’s thesis of sovereignty as, 
“through death . . . the discontinuous beings that we are dissolve, not without voluptuousness and 
trembling, into the continuity of being, setting themselves free of the condition that attaches them 
to mortal individuality.”104 In her interpretation of Bataille, she rejects Arendt’s notion that we 
embrace death with ease. In fact, according to Cavarero, Bataille’s sovereignty is only accessed 
at the point of luxury with such unease that it forces a physical response of involuntary shaking, 
of “trembling.” In her reconciliation of him, Cavarero notes that Arendt’s reading of Bataille is 
not uncommon and his reputation as a political philosopher is oftentimes obstructed by his 
controversial subject matter. She points out that, “it is telling in fact that the new theorists of 
community tend to cast a veil of silence over Bataille’s committed affinity of orgy, torture, and 
bodily suffering, as well as his obsessive insistence on eroticism understood in terms of violence 
and violation.”105 Many of Bataille’s critics are hung up on the erotic quality of his writing and 
commit the very act of dispelling taboo which he warns against in his work. Their discomfort 
with his vision of sovereignty, Bataille might suggest, only displays how deeply embedded they 
are in objective life.  
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 A similar critique can be found in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, in which 
Jürgen Habermas criticizes Bataille for his inclination toward the obscene. Although he is not 
particularly offended in the same way that Arendt and other theorists are, Habermas still seems 
unable to read Bataille’s work as that of radical political thought rather than pure erotica. On 
more than one occasion Habermas refers to Bataille as “the erotic writer” in his critique of the 
author. However, he acknowledges that Bataille’s work serves as an interesting counterpart to 
the critiques of modernity presented in the theoretical work by the likes of Lukacs, Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Weber, and Marx. Habermas attests that, “in contrast, Bataille’s approach of moral 
critique is concerned not with discovering still deeper foundations of subjectivity, but with 
unbounding it––with the form of expression that leads the monadically self-encapsulated subject 
back again into the intimacy of a life-context that has become alien, confined, cut off, and 
fragmented.”106 While other theorists focus on the “foundations of subjectivity” or opportunities 
for subjectivity to be recognized in organized society, Bataille’s theory breaks loose from those 
traditions quite literally. The rejection of the very need for a foundation or reification is at the 
root of Bataille’s sovereignty.  
 Habermas ultimately problematizes Bataille’s theory for its inability to reconcile the 
tradition in which it exists and the goal that is sets out to achieve: an unbound sovereign. Marx, 
being an important source of reference for Bataille, is ultimately out of his reach. Habermas 
argues that  
Bataille cannot adopt a politico-economic explanation in the Marxist style because the 
latter is related to changes within the system of social labor––and not to the interplay of 
the economy with a violence that is not rooted in economic domains or in those of 
calculating reason at all, but transcends the process of material exchange between human 
beings and eternal nature from the very start, as the other of reason.107 
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Bataille’s attachment to Marx undeniably confuses his theory. While they both desire to reject 
the systematization of individuals in objective life, Marx offers a vision of subjectivity within 
modernity that is reliant on the prevailing order. Bataille, on the other hand, offers a deviation 
from these systems as a loophole to modern reality’s condition. These two cannot be reconciled. 
While Bataille can certainly be, and certainly is, inspired by Marx’s theory, Marxism cannot 
participate in Bataille’s work in any resolving way. Any attempt to reference or relate Bataille’s 
theory to Marx’s renders Bataille’s work awkward.  
 According to Habermas, Bataille’s theory is debilitated by its occupation of a liminal 
theoretical space. He states that, “in the end Bataille oscillates between an incoherent 
reattachment to the Hegelian project of a dialectic of enlightenment, on the one hand, and an 
unmediated juxtaposition of scholarly analysis and mysticism, on the other.”108 Habermas seems 
confused by Bataille’s attempts to break free from the tradition while still writing within it, 
invoking it, and appealing to its audience. Bataille’s reconfiguration of social contract theory can 
come across as unintelligible to those who are used to its traditional form. In Habermas’ opinion, 
“the erotic writer can still use language in a poetic way, such that the reader, assaulted by 
obscenity, gripped by the shock of the unexpected and unimaginable, is jolted into the 
ambivalence of loathing and pleasure,” while practically speaking, “philosophy cannot in the 
same way break out of the universe of language.”109 While his theory looks and sounds like the 
theory of those philosophers that Habermas compares him to, Bataille’s writing ultimately works 
to disrupt the very tradition that those theories reinforce. Ultimately, for Habermas and many 
other readers of Bataille, his work comes across as paradoxical and fantastical. Bataille’s 
solution is seen as inaccessible by those who are unable to imagine the reality of an unbound life.  
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However, Bataille’s theory is evidently hindered by its conception within the very 
framework that it works to reject. The issue with Bataille’s theory is not his vision of some 
grotesque cathartic pleasure, but its inseparability from the very bounds that he asserts are 
necessarily broken during sovereign moments. While his conception of modernity and the 
struggles that face man in daily life are accurate and the modes through which he envisions a 
return to sovereignty are believable, the problem lies in his concept of the accursed share. The 
accursed share, excess energy, itself is reliant on the capitalist notion that surplus should be 
reinvested. Thus, in order to reach sovereignty the subject must first acknowledge and ratify the 
very structures which seek to limit them. Needing to ground ecstatic reclamations of sovereignty 
in something that is familiar is understandable, but can Bataille’s theory survive this 
complication?  
 Would it be possible to accept all aspects of Bataille’s theory while rejecting the very 
namesake of his work? The accursed share is named just that because of its precarious existence. 
In Bataille’s theory it is spent on either luxurious, “wasteful” sovereignty or overflows and is 
spent on violent warring behaviors. Presented with this ultimatum, specifically in the context of a 
post-war landscape, most individuals would prefer sovereignty over war. So, can there be 
sovereignty without an excess of energy? It is undeniable that political individuals work, they go 
to school, they participate in acts that orient them in objective life, but they also gasp, in 
laughter, in sob, in sex. In those moments they are sovereign because they are not enacting some 
excess energy which is deemed as such because it cannot be spent usefully elsewhere.  
 Despite its contradiction, Bataille’s vision for sovereignty engages in death and eroticism 
in an inspiring way. While his argument does not present itself as traditional social contract 
theory, it displays some of its key qualities. This is evident in his questioning of how individuals 
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become sovereign and his confrontation of the impediments which obstruct self-governance. 
However, his assertion that sovereignty allows for deviance breaks from the tradition and makes 
way for the exploration of unbound sexuality, identity, and subjectivity. It is in the unbinding of 
these sovereign moments that the subject is liberated. Free from the limits of history and 
objective life, man disrupts normativity and, in turn, opens up a void in which sovereignty can be 
experienced.  
In these moments an individual is truly sovereign because they experience an ecstasy in 
which they can no longer be constrained by any bond, including the named bond of excess, 
which ties them to organized life. Despite being unavoidably grounded in the reality of the 
material world and limited by the words which bring him into the realm of intelligibility, 
Bataille’s political philosophy is successful in guiding a political individual through the unease 
of socially contracted life.  
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Myth Busting  
“It would seem that we are condemned for some time  
yet always to speak excessively about reality.”  
––Roland Barthes, Mythologies  
 
 
 Social contract theory contributes to the tradition of mythological foundings.110 In its 
origin, social contract theory is a political form of mythology that arises during a specific 
material moment in history. It responds to the need for an effective explanation of the present 
moment and the reimagination of a more desirable future. The origin of a social contract theory 
is mythological because it disrupts a political reality and inserts an alternative one. In its 
perpetuation, the present moment continually places demands on a social contract to invent 
systems through which we form our communal understanding of reality. The perpetuation of a 
social contract is mythological because it relies on a constant reinvention of the collective 
political imaginary. It is in these processes of reimagination that social contract theory enacts a 
mythical quality which both drives and limits the social contract itself. The fictional character of 
its theory ultimately endows the social contract with a precariously paradoxical existence.  
The political mythology of social contract theory is not in itself bad or harmful in any 
moral sense. Myth, in fact, is one way in which new meaning can be found within prevailing 
systems of authority in order to liberate oppressed individuals. Mythology forms a coherent 
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system of meaning making which enables individuals to express their sovereign particularity. 
However, it is also this essential mythical quality which inhibits a social contract’s ability to 
fully realize and address the need which brought it into being. Moreover, while the myth itself is 
not damaging, efforts made to perpetuate or distort the myth in modern times have had an 
adverse effect. It is important to evaluate the practical appearance of a myth in relation to its 
theoretical creation in order to better understand the ways in which the myth has deviated from 
its foundation.  
Due to political mythology’s practical intention, the social contract harms its citizens by 
placing artificial limits on their sovereignty. Such is the case with Locke’s social contract, these 
artificial limits are omitted in theory but oftentimes surface in practical manifestations. A social 
contract’s constant reinvention of the political imagination incessantly delimits an individual’s 
political subjectivity. These inventions encircle both the political subject and their social contract 
with their mythical origins. Nontraditional social contract theorists, such as Georges Bataille, 
offer alternative methods of breaking the fictitious chains placed upon individual sovereignty.  
Social contracts are more necessary and most relevant in the event of a beginning. It is no 
coincidence that the likes of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and so on, all found themselves creating 
their respective social contracts in times of social uncertainty and political unrest. In an attempt 
to create something new from and through these social contracts, traditional theorists engage in a 
retelling, or reorienting, of what some might call the “political anthropology” or what others 
refer to as history.111 This is the mythological origin of a social contract.  
Friedrich Nietzsche might associate the act of reorientation that social contract theory 
engages in with what he calls “critical history.” In most cases, the creation of a social contract 
can be found precisely at the point when, “in order to live, man must possess the strength, and 
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occasionally employ it, to shatter and disintegrate a past.”112 Here, Nietzsche’s words design the 
need for a new social contract as a means of survival. It comes about when a contemporary way 
of life threatens to negate individual subjectivity and the prevailing political imaginary must be 
reimagined.  
Another essential element of critical history is the way in which individuals who engage 
in the tradition attempt to reshape the collective political imagination. Due to the fact that “it is 
impossible to free ourselves completely from this chain [which links us to the mistakes of earlier 
generations] . . . we plant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that the 
first nature withers.”113 This “new habit, new instinct, second nature,” enacts mythology. It 
requires planting and is, thus, artificial. It is also essential for the distinction between a past and 
present or future. While the past was based on the first nature, an old social contract, or possibly 
no social contract at all, the present or future ought to be based on the second nature––on a new 
social contract. Eventually, “for those who struggle, for those who use critical history in the 
service of life, there is significant consolation in knowing that even this first nature was once a 
second nature, and that every victorious second nature will become a first.”114 This is to say that 
a social contract, and so too a political myth, a noble lie, a founding fiction, and so on, becomes 
ingrained in the collective psychic character over time. Americans make unconscious claims for 
their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness just as a ruler is assumed to have gold spun into them 
by the gods in Plato’s Republic.115  
By disrupting prevailing political and social orders, critical history demarcates the past 
and opens up the present and future to new ways of socio-political organizing. Although the past 
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colors the present with both its successes and failures, it also boldly outlines the present as set 
apart or different from previously predominant systems. Traditional social contract theory stakes 
a claim on the contemporary moment and asserts that it, whatever it is, is better equipped to 
realize the modern needs of the individuals who it attempts to organize. Modern revolutions 
similarly engage in critical history through their efforts to create something wholly new.  
While her notions of freedom do not participate in the same assessment of sovereignty 
that this project attempts, Hannah Arendt’s work on political action and new beginnings is 
important to consider in our analysis of the practicality of a social contract’s mythical origins.116 
Arendt contends that “crucial, then, to any understanding of revolutions in the modern age is that 
the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide.”117 Attention should 
be drawn to the emphasis placed on “the idea of freedom and the experience of a new 
beginning.” Arendt is careful not to empower freedom and beginning alone as the forces behind 
revolutionary action. Instead, the idea of freedom accompanied by all of its ambiguous 
guarantees sparks a revolt. Similarly, the experience of a new beginning, the feeling of isolation 
or fragmentation from a previously normative way of life, inspires insurgency. Thus, revolution 
occurs when individuals are inspired to radically redefine and reorient their subjectivity in the 
world and begin something new according to this transformation.118 Despite being radical in her 
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thought on the political catharsis of new beginnings during revolutionary times, Arendt does not 
go quite as far as her post-war contemporaries, such as Bataille, to rethink political subjectivity 
outside of the binds of traditional social contract theory.  
Conversely, Bataille criticizes the historical tradition of revolutions in order to orient his 
notion of sovereignty outside of the limits of political organization. Bataille speaks “of those 
movements that we strive to make immutable, immobile, of those revolutions that we regard as a 
state, a lasting entity, that we naively preserve, as if their essence were not change.”119 
Ultimately, revolution fails to provide the political subject with catharsis, according to Bataille, 
because it brings the political action which inspires it to a halt. It provides an end for the political 
imagination and, in so doing, limits it. In order to be truly cathartic, the state which once resulted 
from revolution must be ever-evolving. The moment in which political action is immobilized and 
revolution is deemed a threat exposes the limits of a social contract. Such is the case with the 
American Constitution which has only witnessed twenty-seven amendments in its over two 
hundred years of existence. It is in this way that revolution could be seen as the first invention 
through which social contract theory is mythically perpetuated.  
In moments of beginning, a social contract fulfills the need introduced by revolution for 
the invention of newness. While new beginnings make space for artificial explanations of social 
and political organization, the sustainment of the social contract requires further fabrication. It is 
in this space where the social contract invents a people to be governed, visions of sovereignty to 
strive for, systems of power to be wielded, and new uses of language to persuade. These 
inventions introduce further limits upon both the political subject and their imagination.  
Another one of the many artificial restrictions invented by social contract theory is the 
myth of the people. Each social contract must define to whom it is obliged and the ways in which 
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they can oblige them. In Inventing the People, Edmund Morgan addresses the myth of the people 
and their role in both creating and sustaining the social contract during revolutionary times. Like 
Arendt, Morgan locates the origin of the myth as an invention which is born during the process 
of beginning anew. Before the American Revolution, mass discontent with the monarchical style 
of rule in England triggered, “a new ideology, a new rationale, a new set of fictions [which]was 
necessary to justify a government in which the authority of kings stood below that of the people 
or their representatives.”120 It is at this point that Locke became inspired to write his own social 
contract. While English politicians chose to perpetuate a myth of the people that preserved the 
monarchy, American revolutionaries bound their new beginning to a social contract inspired in 
part by Locke. Almost one hundred years after Locke published his Second Treatise, “after that 
contest [of the American Revolution] began, Americans explored the meaning and methods of 
popular sovereignty as though for the first time.”121 Although their English forefathers had 
already been grappling with the issue of popular sovereignty for years, American revolutionaries 
had the experience of beginning a new journey for their idea of freedom. The definition of a 
people whose sovereignty reigned supreme served as the basis of this journey, as well as the 
distinction between the English past and an American future.  
America’s new beginning was both critical of and reliant upon the historical “chain” 
which bound it to its colonial roots.122 The common problem of sovereignty bonded America to 
England and confronted the fantasy of their social contract with their material reality. Morgan 
notes that “Americans were discovering, as the English had discovered in the preceding century, 
that the sovereignty of the people could pose threats to the very values it was ostensibly designed 
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to protect.”123 This paradox is irreconcilable within the mythical framework of America’s 
founding. Early America’s inability to solve the problem of sovereignty reflects the limitations of 
its social contract and its artificial shortcomings.  
In order to overcome the chain which bound them to these shortcomings, American 
revolutionists took again to the task of invention. Morgan insists that  
when the Americans declared independence and went about setting up new governments . 
. . they had developed at nearly all levels of their society, a degree of political 
sophistication and experience that enabled them to translate abstractions into practice, or, 
to put it another way, to give a plausible factual basis to the fictions of popular 
sovereignty.124 
 
The “abstractions” which he alludes to are most evidently social contract theories, specifically 
that of Locke. While Morgan identifies America as being distinctly successful in inventing the 
people through consistent and persistent efforts to imbed these “abstractions” at “all levels of 
their society,” the great difficulty of practically realizing popular sovereignty proves otherwise. 
Popular sovereignty introduces the problem of representation. How can the sovereignty of the 
people be realized within a governing entity that undeniably takes power out of the hands of the 
many and puts it in those of the few? Morgan notes that, in order to answer the question which 
has been posed, American revolutionaries “discovered a new and more effective way of bending 
the sovereignty of the people to overcome the deficiencies” of the myth.125 Therefore, in order to 
give “a plausible factual basis to the fictions of popular sovereignty,” American revolutionaries 
had to “bend” the definition of sovereignty which had originally inspired both their new 
beginning and their invention of a unified people. It is evident that the invention of the people, in 
the American case, was largely reliant on the social contract’s invention of sovereignty.  
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 The myth of the people runs into its limits as it meets those of the myth of sovereignty. 
Henry Tudor asserts that “myths are untranslatable” because “they cannot be interpreted 
rationally; they are interpreted only by new myths, by being transformed.”126 Thus, the only way 
to understand the myth of the people is to concoct a myth about their sovereignty. In turn, the 
only way to rationalize such an absolute sovereignty is to fabricate a commanding people who 
empower it. Whether the myth of the people came before the myth of sovereignty, or vice versa, 
will be left up to debate. However, it is unequivocal that the need to fabricate sovereignty and a 
people coincide in America. In The Foundations of Sovereignty, Harold Laski acknowledges the 
mythical limits of social contract theory, specifically in relation to its invention of sovereignty:  
Sovereignty––Locke does not use the word––flows always towards the centre of 
administration. That is why so much of Locke’s thinking turned upon limitations of 
governmental power. That was why, not only for himself, but for all his successors to the 
time of Rousseau, the legal theory of sovereignty proved always too narrow for final 
acceptance. 127  
 
Sovereignty, as has thus far been argued, is the great problem which social contract theory sets 
out to solve but ultimately fails to address. The social contract’s practical inability to realize its 
inventions, such as the people or sovereignty, is due to the very limits which allow the inventions 
to be understood. The artificial definitions which bring social contract theory and its inventions 
into the realm of intelligibility fundamentally wound the myth with a paradoxical narrowness.   
 Riddled with paradox and inhibited by its fictional origins, popular sovereignty 
nevertheless persists as the foundation of America’s social contract. Despite classifying popular 
sovereignty as an “impossible fiction,” Laski contends that “that is not to allege its lack of 
influence. On the contrary, it is matter of record that it has again and again, been the basis of 
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popular action; and it is still, for the most, the theoretical basis of popular government.”128 This, 
however, further reveals the failure of social contract theory in its practical application. 
Determined efforts to find logic and reason in an “impossible fiction” as the basis of governance 
renders the social contract, as well as the political subjectivity which it forms, vulnerable to 
harmful distortions and a further “bending” away from its theoretical origins.129 Thus, a social 
contract in “practice, in this regard, limps painfully behind the theory it is to sustain.”130 Social 
contract theory, and so too myth, does not hold up to practice in reality. Instead, they appear as 
mere restrictions arbitrarily placed upon the political subjects who supposedly justify them with 
their own sovereign power. In spite of being allegedly derived from the will of the people, the 
social contract in practice betrays their particular sovereignty and instead assumes a more 
general and hollow appearance.  
 The ignorance of particular sovereignty is the most significant way in which the social 
contract practically fails the individual on the problem of sovereignty. Despite being invented as 
the basis of both government and the people themselves, sovereignty cannot be fully attained 
beyond its mythical limits. Laski highlights this downfall by stating that “it is useless to call the 
sovereignty of the people effective if the organs through which it works fail to do justice to 
popular desire.”131 He doesn’t stop there. In fact, he further exposes the mythical foundations of 
sovereignty by emphasizing its rational limits and its inability to satisfy an individual’s desire for 
uninhibited sovereign acts. He asks “what, at bottom, is justice to popular desire? What popular 
desire must be accepted by the statesman? . . . Are there, in fact, popular desires to which 
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attention ought not to be paid, because they are wrong?”132 These are questions that a social 
contract, America’s Founding Fathers, and Locke himself have not and cannot answer. This is 
when the need arises to look past canonical figures toward other voices that are more accurately 
representative of society and desire’s function within it.  
 Desire, for Bataille, does not baffle sovereignty as it does in traditional social contract 
theory. While desire contradicts the mythical sovereignty that is invented by the social contract, 
it informs the sovereignty found in Bataille’s theoretical workings. In fact, excessive acts of 
eroticism and love––expressions of desire––allow the individual to enact a truly powerful 
unlimited sovereignty. He declares that sometimes 
passion, desire and their immediate satisfaction put on reasons that disguise them and 
give them the appearance of a useful means. Conversely, if the principle of a sovereign 
value is affirmed beyond the value of utility (the pure means), it remains vague and, 
lacking definition, is hard to distinguish from that which it aims to contradict.133 
 
Here, Bataille discerns between useful desire and sovereign desire. The former engages in 
notions of utility that carry with them the weight of predominant, primarily capitalist, concepts of 
authority. Desire is made useful by authority figures who see it as a means for the perpetuation of 
their power. Excessive desire––that is, desire which is acted upon outside of the normative 
systems of power––opens a space in which the individual can practice their sovereignty. Without 
an externally assigned value, this kind of desire cannot contradict any sense of sovereignty other 
than that which chooses to act upon the desire in the first place.  
 The myth fails to translate from theory to practice in part because those who apply it are 
excluded by their proximity from the circumstance in which the need for a social contract arose. 
They did not write the social contract, nor did they even experience the reality in which the 
theory was written. Each application moves the myth further from its origins. Tudor claims that 
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“a myth does not shape itself” because “it is shaped and reshaped by the men who pass it on; and 
they shape it in accordance with their own presuppositions and in response to their particular 
experiences in the world.”134 It is in this way that a social contract invents power. Those who 
shape the myth do so not only “in accordance with their own presuppositions” and “particular 
experiences in the world” but also in relation to the organization of power which best suits them. 
 A contemporary material example of this is the political slogan, “Make America Great 
Again.” While popularized by Donald Trump in his 2016 presidential bid, it was also used in 
campaign speeches made by Ronald Reagan, as well as both Bill and Hillary Clinton. This 
slogan fundamentally perpetuates the social contract by diagnosing a problem within society and 
proposing the institution of government as its cure. Moreover, it mythologizes a moment in 
America’s history that was once “great.” It calls for a return to the social contract, the revolution, 
the vision of reality which once provided relief for a political subject’s unease. The use of 
“again” claims that society has fallen from this “greatness.” By staking this claim, Trump and 
other politicians empower their notions of “greatness,” the time in which individuals like them 
experienced it, and a myth of modern reality that might realize it. Trump’s presidency thus far 
suggests that America was last great during moments of political divisiveness, social 
homogeneity, and widespread suspicion of difference. “Make America Great Again” distorts 
reality in a way that not only perpetuates the need for a social contract but also invents the power 
which allows Trump to “grab [women] by the pussy,” label some countries as “shitholes,” and 
declare that white-nationalists are “very fine people.”  
 These acts of distortion rely on the invention of language. By the invention of language, 
the introduction of new uses of language that form divergent networks of communication which 
work to transform meaning is implied, not the mere invention of words. Roland Barthes asserts 
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simply that “myth is language.”135 That is, language is comprised of artificial signifying words 
and images which come to convey meaning through shared universal understanding and 
employment. Myth, like language, renders an experience more coherent. However, an applied 
myth, a myth that becomes consumed by its utility, is emptied of its radical expressive quality. 
Barthes further elaborates that mythology is “a mode of signification, a form,” but “when it 
becomes form, the meaning leaves its contingency behind; it empties itself, it becomes 
impoverished, history evaporates, only the letter remains.”136 Myth, and so too the social 
contract, becomes detached from the ever-changing material world in which it appears. It instead 
becomes attached to a meaning––a meaning which was once able to account for reality but is 
now constrained by its fixed form. Meaning within systems of language is reliant on objective 
knowledge and so too the information of objective life.  
 Myth becomes rhetorical language when its use becomes rigid and it is invested with 
purpose. Rhetoric, as Barthes defines it, is “a set of fixed, regulated, insistent figures.”137 
Rhetoric is meant to persuade thought or produce a specific reaction. A mythical social contract 
which becomes transfixed by rhetoric no longer attempts to relieve its citizens by expressing 
their reality. Instead, it attempts to persuade them of a specific reality, one that does not 
necessarily reflect their material experience, needs, or desires. Authority figures who possess the 
power to distort the foundation of sovereignty and the theoretical framework of a social contract 
use rhetorical language to empty the myth of its cathartic potential. The myth no longer offers an 
inspired vision of new beginnings when it is appropriated as a tool by individuals who use it to 
invent and wield power.  
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 Although it is difficult to choose just one instance in which Trump has emptied language 
of its meaning, he clearly did so when he declared “I am your voice” at the 2016 Republican 
National Convention. The rhetoric of this statement is twofold. First and foremost, it is a figure 
of speech. The vagueness of “your” speaks to everyman. While one might assume that someone 
running to be the President of the United States would attempt to represent the voices of all 
Americans, the event suggests that Trump’s target audience is exclusively Republican. 
Furthermore, since taking office, his words and actions imply an even more nuanced “you” ––a 
“you” who wants to “build the wall” or “lock her up.” His assertion that “I am your voice” is also 
rhetorical in the way that it acts as a means of persuasion. It is presented under the guise of 
providing a voice for the supposed voiceless. However, it just further perpetuates the myth of a 
reality in which a fixed social contract can fulfill the needs of its ever-changing citizens.  
 Locke himself employs rhetorical language in the creation of his social contract. While 
Torrey Shanks views Locke’s rhetoric as doing the work of radical reorientation in Authority 
Figures, this chapter places Locke among those who delimit political imaginations in order to 
fabricate reality. Despite admitting that “there is something that does not seem to sit right 
between the style [of rhetoric] and the substance of Locke’s thought,” Shanks believes that, 
through his work, “Locke creates an alternate history from matters of fact that offers a new 
vocabulary of judgement.”138 It is through this “alternate history” that Shanks locates the success 
of Locke’s social contract in practice. According to Shanks, Locke grounds his theory in not the 
chain of history nor the plurality of experience but in “matters of fact.” These “facts” form an 
“alternate history” which explains a reality that justifies his social contract. The danger of 
alternative facts should be clear by now.  
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It is unsustainable, if not reckless, to ignore reality when making judgements on society 
and creating theoretical frameworks based on those judgements. Revisiting Barthes, the danger 
arises when myth forgets reality and form replaces imagination: “the meaning contained a whole 
system of values: a history, a geography, a morality, a zoology, a Literature. The form has put all 
this richness at a distance.”139 Drawing from an alternate history, Locke’s social contract theory 
suspends itself from practical life. Furthermore, appropriations of Locke’s social contract lack a 
richness of meaning in every sense of the word. In an attempt to separate a social contract of the 
present from that of the past, a myth of yesterday from a myth for tomorrow, meaning and 
meaning making are weaponized as a means of distortion.  
 Despite acknowledging the generative quality of new beginnings and new meanings, 
Shanks mistakes Locke’s rhetoric as the latchkey to the expansion of a collective political 
imaginary. Shanks falsely claims that  
to speak of the creation of new vocabularies issuing from new memories and histories 
reaches beyond what philosophical principles can produce. It is the work of generating 
meaning and of affective (re)orientations. It is the work of rhetoric that is the condition 
for judgement beyond existing opinions, or in other words, the conditions of critique.140 
 
Transcending prevailing systems of “opinions” or “critique” is not the work of rhetoric. Nor is it 
the work of systematized language or distorted myth. Moreover, it is especially not the work of 
traditional social contract theory. All of which are bound by form and accursed by intelligible 
rigidity. In fact, “the work of generating meaning and of affective (re)orientations” belongs in 
part to what have thus far been referred to as sovereign acts. It is these acts, such as eroticism, 
love, and death, which work in the margins of normative thought traditions in order to radically 
rethink political subjectivity and relocate sovereignty.  
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 A dependence on myth to ground reality proves the shortcoming of not only theory but of 
humanity. Relying on artificial frameworks, external authorities, and someone else’s thoughts 
confine the political subject within an organized life and narrow autonomy. Yet, we eagerly 
attach out political subjectivity––and so too our claim to reality––to ideologies, parties, 
movements, and identities which are not of our own making. Barthes says that  
the fact that we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality 
doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation: we constantly drift between the 
object and its demystification, powerless to render its wholeness. For if we penetrate the 
object, we liberate it but we destroy it; and if we acknowledge its full weight, we respect 
it, but we restore it to a state which is still mystified. It would seem that we are 
condemned for some time yet always to speak excessively about reality. This is probably 
because ideologism and its opposite are types of behaviour which are still magical, 
terrorized, blinded and fascinated by the split in the social world. And yet, this is what we 
must seek: a reconciliation between reality and men, between description and 
explanation, between object and knowledge.141 
 
We cling to myths, regardless of how accurate they are, in an attempt to stabilize our grasp of 
reality. However, “a serious contradiction has emerged” and men are not put in touch with reality 
but instead further alienated from it.142 We are faced with a constant tension between seeking to 
define reality and freely living it. To Barthes, definition is utilitarian and robs life of its meaning. 
Yet, living life in the dark presents its own difficulties.143 The fixed attachment of life to 
ideology and the rejection of it both operate out of an aversion to what Barthes calls the “split in 
the social world” and what Bataille refers to as a “general economy.”144 Both record a social 
arrangement in which that which is normatively considered useful or reasonable is pitted against 
that which is deemed excessive or luxurious. In other words, both Barthes and Bataille identify 
the conflict between objective life and subjective life as irreconcilable. Additionally, both share 
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the sentiment that “it would seem that we are condemned for some time yet always to speak 
excessively about reality.” 
 While Barthes sees excess in linguistic attempts to capture reality, Bataille sees it as an 
opening in which sovereignty can be experienced in ways that the social contract cannot realize. 
In many ways Bataille provides the “reconciliation” that Barthes urges “we must seek.” 
However, Bataille assuages Barthes qualm about the split of the social world by embracing the 
“mystified” life. That being said, Bataille hesitates to wholeheartedly reject order and instead 
acknowledges our social and political positionality within set institutions. Bataille surmises that, 
all in all, man has become a riddle for himself. The elements of this riddle are scattered in 
history, and in the present only those sovereign moments in a diffuse state, whose 
constant reality and deep significance we cannot deny, contribute to a possible solution. 
The contribution comes from within ourselves, but its objective existence is firmly 
established.145 
 
To some’s surprise, he does not attempt to dismantle the institutions found in objective existence 
but instead chooses to think of ways in which individuals can act in and around institutional 
authority in order to claim their sovereign subjectivity. Despite being fixed in our lives as social 
and political beings, we are able to stabilize our grasp on reality during “sovereign moments” 
which occur in the liminal spaces of objective life.  
 Bataille’s location of sovereignty bypasses social contract theory because it transcends 
the need for mythical origins and artificial perpetuations. This is most evident in his treatment of 
language. He argues that “the world is always richer than language.”146 If we were to use myth 
synonymously with language, as Barthes suggests is possible, then a myth is also considered to 
empty the reality it attempts to explain. Both myth and language systematize experience in order 
to make it communicable, but in so doing also confine the possibilities of life to those which are 
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conventional or relatable. Language traps the individual in objective knowledge. While Barthes 
and others view language as a necessary evil, Bataille explores alternate modes of mediation 
which allow a subject to orient themselves in their material reality.  
 Without language, Bataille’s subject is tasked with affirming both their subjectivity and 
sovereignty through other means. This is not to say that Bataille proposes a life of silent solitude. 
It would be unreasonable to suggest that an individual can only access sovereignty when they 
cease communicating with others. Yet, the disparity between subjective knowledge, knowledge 
which is internal and unbound by the need to be expressed, and objective knowledge, that which 
is universally known, presents a challenge. Ordinarily, this disparity requires language to bridge 
the two. However, according to Bataille, it is overcome by sovereign acts which express 
sovereign moments: “we speak of laughter, of tears, of love, beyond the experiences we have of 
them, as objectively conditioned impulses.”147 Divesting these acts from their objective 
implications means that they are not perceived alongside their purpose or utility. This requires a 
process of unknowing. Subjective knowledge says that one does not laugh because they are 
happy or cry because they are sad––they do so because they can, because their sovereignty 
desires it. These expressive acts inform an objective knowledge of the laugher, the cryer, the 
lover’s unbound sovereignty in that moment.  
 Sovereign acts suspend the political individual, however briefly, from their fixedness as 
part of a myth––of the people, of sovereignty, of power, and of language––of a social contract. 
They reopen the space that was once filled by the social contract and reintroduce the experience 
of limitless possibilities which was last witnessed at the point of beginning anew. Language 
becomes obsolete and the need for a foundational myth seems hollow during “these great tides of 
miraculous possibility, where moreover the transparency, the richness and the soothing splendor 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 233.  
  67 
of death and the universe are to be regained, [and] presuppose the imagination joining together 
that which is never given except in parts.”148 The political imagination, no longer obligated to the 
work of myth or social contract, pieces together the self that was once fragmented by the many 
demands placed on it by objective life. Then, and only then, can the political imaginary realize 
the sovereignty vested in a unified subject. It is precisely in these “miraculous” moments that 
“the work of generating meaning and of affective (re)orientations” is done.149 
 It should be clear that the preceding argument is not one against myth. As previously 
stated, myth has an expressive quality which relieves a political subject from the harsh confines 
of organized life. In the circumstance in which we find ourselves, one of fallen sovereignty, our 
imaginations are the sole proprietors of sovereign moments. Fantasy allows for the uninhibited 
pursuit of desire. Moreover, as Bataille asserts, domains of eroticism, love, death, and so on, are 
profoundly imaginary. However, fantasy which seeks to distort rather than reveal reality no 
longer liberates the political subject. When mythology becomes a form of persuasion, as 
traditional social contract theory has, the imagination becomes accursed.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Normative social contract theory is not reflective of our present historical moment. The 
space between the theoretical underpinnings of our country and the reality which they still 
attempt to explain through popular political rhetoric are apparent. The values held by Locke, 
Hobbes, and Rousseau are not wholly representative of our human condition today. Put simply, 
our contemporary problems cannot be solved by solutions that were created for problems of the 
past. We must ask ourselves, why social contract theory, and the institutions born out of it, 
should remain petrified in our ever-changing world. And simultaneously we must ask: How can 
we have a more expansive understanding of social contract theory? This project hopes to 
theoretically contribute to that mission by incorporating Bataille’s work, which speaks to many 
of the political crises we face today.  
This project raises more questions than it answers. Who else belongs in the canon of 
social contract theory? Do other social contract theories fail the people that they claim to 
constitute and represent? What social, political, and economic problems have been embedded in 
the political institutions that house life in America today? Does a successful traditional social 
contract exist? If so, in what ways do successful social contracts differ from those that fail? 
Another unanswered question is, what of the practical manifestations of social contract theory 
that lie outside of the American example? Can we think about social contract theory more 
globally? We might also ask what of Burma or Catalonia? How have these regions’ social 
contracts failed and in what ways must they be updated in order to meet the needs of their 
peoples’ present material moment?  
  69 
I see future research extending the work done by this project primarily in two ways. The 
first would use my claim of traditional social contract theory’s failure to retroactively assess a 
country’s betrayal of its citizens. For example, someone could attempt to understand the 
Holocaust as a result of Hitler’s distortion of Germany’s social contract. This would be a natural 
extension of this project considering Bataille’s political philosophy itself attempts, in part, to 
retroactively understand the international trauma caused by Nazi Germany. The second way of 
extending the work done by this project would be to apply its findings to a present or future 
political circumstance. For example, how can Burma reconcile its present moment with the 
colonial and post-colonial political myths which have hitherto dictated its socio-political 
organization? Furthermore, how can the people of Burma vest their political organization with 
the sovereignty of each and every citizen as they continue the process of democratic reform? 
Regardless of how future researchers will attempt to extend my claims, this project not only 
inspires but demands us to continue its work.  
While my project starts and ends with Bataille, future projects should continue to expand 
the canon of traditional social contract theory. The addition of Bataille to the canon of political 
thought does not render it fixed or satisfied in any way. We should all participate in seeking new 
and divergent meanings of our political significance. If our contemporary historical moment 
refuses to stagnate, then so should we and so should our efforts of achieving political 
representation.  
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